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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The interpretation of the following Statutes and Rules is 
beheved to be determinative of the issues addressed in Point VI. A 
of this brief. 
UCA§57-4a-4(l) (d): 
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions 
regarding title to the real property affected: 
* 
* 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time 
between dates on the document and the date of recording. 
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It 
will be sufficient if the findings of facts and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed 
by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of 
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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WILFORD L. HAFEN and JO ANN B. ] 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
I. JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78-2-2 (1953, as amended). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(k)(1953, as amended). 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in quieting title to property under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, where the deed segregating title to 
the property parcels was executed in 1973, and recorded in 1983. 
1. Mr. Jacobs challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding that separate ownership of the property 
had been established in 1973. 
2. Mr. Jacobs contends that the trial court committed error in 
concluding that one element of boundary by acquiescence, i.e., "for a long 
1 
period of time", had been met, because it was for eighteen-and-one-half 
years . 
The Appeals Court reviews factual findings of the trial court, 
giving great deference to the trial court's view of the evidence. A 
presumption arises concerning the validity of the trial court's findings and 
judgment. The appeals court will set aside such factual findings only if 
they are clearly against the weight of the evidence, clearly erroneous, or 
induced by an erroneous view of the law. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Jeppson v. Jeppson. 684 P2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984); 
State in Interest of K.K.H.. 610 P2d 849, 851 (Utah, 1980); Smith v. Linmar 
Energy Corp.. 790 P2d 1222, 1224 (Utah App 1990); Schindler v. Schindler. 
776 P2d 84, 88 (Utah App 1989); Jensen v. Brown. 639 P2d 150, 152 (Utah 
1981); URCP, Rule 52 (a). 
The trial court's determination as to the applicable law is 
reviewed for correctness. Where there is substantial, competent, 
admissible evidence to support the conclusions reached, the appeals court 
will not disturb the conclusions. The evidence and the inferences that 
fairly and reasonably are drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the judgment entered. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070, 
1071; Bush v. Coult. 594 P2d 865, 866 (Utah 1979); Van Dvke v. Chappell. 
818 P2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang; 613 P2d 
512, 514 (Utah 1980); Reimschiissel v. Russell. 649 P2d 26, 27 (Utah 
1982). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Opposing Counsel's statement of the nature of the case is 
accurately reflected. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to Mr. Jacobs' statement of facts, the Hafens 
believe the following facts or clarifications are necessary for an adequate 
review of this matter. 
1. The Hafens claim of title dates back to April 15, 1973, 
when Castle Creek Properties executed a Warranty Deed to E&F 
Investment Company, Inc., and Joe Hutchings. Trial exhibit 18. (this deed 
affected the property in sections 35 and 36, and is reproduced in the 
Addendum). 
2. E&F Investment Company, Inc. and Joe Hutchings conveyed 
the same property, by two separate warranty deeds to Santa Clara Heights, 
Inc., on April 1, 1979. Trial exhibits 16 and 17. 
3. Santa Clara Heights, Inc. conveyed the property by 
warranty deed to Wilford L. Hafen on October 21, 1982. Trial exhibit 15. 
Mr Jacobs' brief, at page 4, and the trial transcript at page 42, indicate that 
the Hafens purchased this property in October, 1988. This is an apparent 
error, as the deed is dated October, 21 1982 and recorded January, 31 
1 9 8 1 . 
4. The deed Mr. Jacobs states conveyed property in all four 
sections from Castle Creek Properties to Security Title Company on April 9, 
1981, (see Mr. Jacobs' brief at page 6), only conveyed the Kane County 
property in sections one and two. See Tr. 30 and Trial exhibit 2. 
5. Mr. Jacobs' surveyor had surveyed the area in 1979, 1985 
and in 1992. Tr. 19; Findings of Fact No. 8. 
6. This area of property is known as the Swapp Pasture and is 
3 
entirely fenced. All the surrounding area is open range and has no fences, 
except along the highway. Tr. 43-44. 
7. The property was used basically for grazing from 1952 to 
the present. Tr. 46-47. 
8. Mr. Hafen was never asked by anyone not to use the entire 
fenced area. Tr. 46, 53-54. 
9. Title companies had been utilized during this time. Two 
title companies were in Mr. Jacobs' chain of title. Findings of Fact No. 9, Tr. 
30-31, Trial exhibits 2 and 4. 
10. Each of the trial courts specific Findings of Fact are 
incorporated herein, and are included in the Addendum. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A, The evidence was sufficient to establish that 
separate ownership of the property was established in April, 
1 9 7 3 . 
The trial court found that separate ownership was established 
in 1973 as to three of the four parcels and earlier for the Section two 
property, and that the acquiescence was for a sufficiently long period of 
time. Findings of Fact No's 3, 7, 10, and 11. In order to overturn a Finding 
of Fact, a party must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding 
and then demonstrate that when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court, the evidence is clearly insufficient to support that finding. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070; Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P2d at 
88; Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp.. 790 P2d at 1224. Mr. Jacobs only 
contests the factual findings that separate ownership was established in 
4 
1973 and that the acquiescence had been for a long period of time. He has 
not marshaled any of the evidence and demonstrated that, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the trial court, such evidence was clearly 
insufficient to support these findings. Failure of Mr. Jacobs to outline the 
evidence in this fashion should be dispositive of his contest to the factual 
issue. College Irr. v. Logan R and Blacksmith F.. 780 P2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 
1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070, 1071; Marchant v. Park City. 
771 P2d 677, 682 (Utah App 1989). Mr. Jacobs argues there are no facts 
supporting the courts determination that eighteen-and-one-half years was 
a sufficiently long period of time. Again, Mr. Jacobs failed to marshal any 
of the evidence and show that the court was clearly erroneous. Such facts 
include the 40-50 years existence of the fence, the parties utilizing title 
companies and surveyors on several occasions, no changes in the fence 
being made even though 3 surveys had been done by the parties and the 
unfenced open range surrounding this property. 
In any event, if the 1973 deed were the only fact in evidence 
concerning when ownership of the property separated, the date of this 
deed would be presumed to be the operative date. Recording of deeds is of 
no import, insofar as the passing of title is concerned. Wickwire v. City and 
Borough of Juneau. 557 P2d 783, 785 (Alaska 1976); Matter of Laue's 
Estate. 225 Kan 177, 589 P2d 558, 563 (1979); Huntington City v. Peterson. 
30 Utah 2d 408, 410, 518 P2d 1246 (1974). If delivery were an issue, the 
burden to establish non-delivery of the deed rested on Mr. Jacobs. He did 
not present any evidence on the subject. Hackett v. Hackett. 429 P2d 753, 
757 (Okla 1967); White v. White. 149 Colo 166, 368 P2d 417, 419 (1962); 
Controlled Receivables. Inc. v. Harman. 17 Utah 2d 420, 423, 413 P2d 807 
(1966). 
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B. Mr. Jacobs has contested only two factual findings, 
i .e . , separate ownership of property in 1973 and that 
acquiescence was for a long period of time. 
All other factual findings of the trial court are presumed 
correct and supported by the record. Likewise, Mr. Jacobs has only argued 
that one element under boundary by acquiescence has not been met, i.e., 
the "long period of time". Therefore, the other three elements are 
established by the trial court's record, i.e., (1) Occupation up to a visible 
line marked by monuments, fences or buildings, (2) Mutual acquiescence 
in the line as a boundary, and (3) by adjoining landowners. 
C. The trial court correctly concluded that the 
boundary had been acquiesced in for Ma long period of time". 
The elements of boundary by acquiescence are succinctly set 
forth in Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). Those 
elements include: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences or buildings; 
2. Mutual Acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
3. For a long period of time; 
4. By adjoining landowners. 
Mr. Jacobs has only challenged the third numbered element. 
The Supreme Court has held that a 15-year-time period is not sufficient to 
establish a boundary. The Supreme Court has pointed out that there is no 
exact time requirement and that the circumstances of each case must be 
considered. However, 20 years is generally accepted as a sufficiently long 
period of time and a lesser period is sufficient where unusual 
circumstances are shown. See Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P2d 535, 539 
6 
(Utah 1984); Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation. 530 P2d 792, 795 
(Utah 1975). This court reviews conclusions of law for correctness; in so 
doing, the court must review "the record for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether there is substantial, competent, admissible evidence to support 
the conclusions reached. If so, this court is precluded from disturbing it." 
Bush v. Coult 594 P2d at 866. See also Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 
P2d at 514; Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070, 1071. 
Accepted facts in this case include: 1. the fence existed for 
over 40-50 years, 2. Mr. Jacobs' predecessors in interest had quit claimed 
the property on several occasions, utilizing a title company, however had 
only issued one warranty deed to the property, and that deed went to Mr. 
Hafen's predecessors in interest in 1973, 3. At least three surveys of the 
property were done in the late 70?s and early 80's, 4. The fence line 
remained unchanged even though the property owners had utilized title 
companies and surveyors, and 5. This parcel of property is fenced, while 
the surrounding area is unfenced open range. 
The trial courts findings and subsequent conclusion that a 
sufficiently long period of time had elapsed was amply supported by the 
evidence, was correct, and should be upheld. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court properly held that the ownership of 
the property became separate in 1973, and was for a long period 
of time. 
The trial court made factual findings that the property had 
different owners in 1973, and that the acquiescence was for a long period 
of time. See Findings of Fact No. 3, 7, 10, and 11. Mr. Jacobs argues that 
7 
the evidence was not sufficient to support these facts. He argues that the 
deed, while being dated April 15, 1973, was not recorded until March 28, 
1983. Mr. Jacobs thus concludes the court committed error in making this 
finding of fact and likewise argues that the eighteen-and-one-half 
intervening years was not a long time. 
These Findings of Fact are entitled to a presumption of validity 
and may not be lightly set aside. Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states in part: "Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous". See also; Scharf 
v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070; Judd Family Limited Partnership v. 
Hutchings . 797 P2d 1088, 1090 (Utah 1990); Schindler v. Schindler. 776 
P2d at 88, Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp. . 790 P2d at 1224, College Irr v. 
Logan R. and Blacksmith F., 780 P2d at 1244. These cases likewise support 
the view that an appellant, when attacking factual findings, "must marshal 
all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court 
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings". Scharf v. BMG 
Corp. , 700 P2d at 1070. The trial court's factual finding that the property 
ownership divided in 1973 is not erroneous at all. Mr. Jacobs' attempt to 
overturn this fact falls far short of the burden he must overcome to have 
this court reject this fact. Initially, the only fact marshaled by Mr. Jacobs 
is the deed dated April 15, 1973, and recorded in 1983. No other facts are 
delineated indicating other evidence the court could reasonably rely upon 
in determining that 1973 was the date ownership was divided, or that it 
was of a sufficiently long time. 
The evidence shows ample and reasonable support for the 
courts findings. 
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There were 4 separate warranty deeds executed by the 
subsequent owners, of the property in sections 35 and 36, prior to the first 
deed of 1973 being recorded. This logically indicates those owners' 
assumption of their immediate rights of ownership and of the delivery of 
their deeds prior to actual recording. These warranty deeds are as follows: 
1. The deed dated April 15, 1973 from Castle Creek to E&F 
Investment and Joe Hutchings. Trial exhibit 18; 
2. E&F Investment and Joe Hutchings executed 2 separate 
deeds dated April 1, 1979 to Santa Clara Heights. Trial exhibits 16 and 17; 
3. Santa Clara Heights deed to Mr. Hafen, dated October 21, 
1982. Trial exhibit 15; 
Each of these deeds were received into evidence upon the stipulation of 
counsel. Tr. 48-50. Other evidence supporting the courts findings include: 
4. Mr. Hafen's use of the property as his own and others use of 
the property for grazing prior to his purchase, and the lack of anyone 
informing Mr. Hafen he could not use the entire fenced pasture property. 
Tr. 46-47, 53-54. The taking possession of and using property, without 
objection of neighbors or others, is reasonable evidence of immediate 
delivery of the deeds and of the acquiescence in the boundary line. 
5. The fence line had been in existence for 40-50 years. 
Findings of Fact 3 and 5. Naturally, it takes 2 different property owners to 
acquiesce in a boundary. However, the long time existence of this fence 
prior to the actual division of the property, accompanied by the original 
owner conveying one parcel away and thereafter not contesting his 
grantees use and possession of the property within the fence line, is 
reasonable support for the court's finding of acquiescence for a long time. 
6. Three surveys had been done on the property. Findings of 
9 
Fact No. 8. No challenge to the fence line or ownership was asserted, even 
though the surveys were done, and corners, quarter corners, etc. were 
established. 
7. The parties did not take action to change the fence line, 
even though they had utilized the services of title companies and 
surveyors. Findings of Fact No. 9. 
8. The property was fenced as a pasture and the surrounding 
land was unfenced, open range. Tr. 43-44. Together with point 5 above, 
this was the only fence around. It is apparent that all associated with the 
property simply accepted it as the boundary, especially after 1973, when 
the property in sections 35 and 36 was conveyed to others. Open range is 
accepted as such - open. When a fence is built, those who have access to 
the area, use the area, or have ownership therein, would naturally 
presume that the particular fenced area is owned by someone and that the 
fence marks that property line. Everything else still remains open range, 
unmarked by fences or boundaries of any kind. 
9. Mr. Hafen had never been advised of any disputes 
concerning the fence line or of his full use of the pasture property. Tr. 46-
47, 53-54. 
10. Mr. Hafen building a house on the property. Tr. 46. 
The property was reconveyed by subsequent owners on several 
occasions prior to the actual recording of the first deed. The act of 
ownership, wherein a party conveys away his rights, and does so by 
warranty deed himself, is reasonable evidence that the 1973 deed 
transferred ownership at that time and not at a point after three owners 
have already conveyed the property again. The owners use and possession 
of the property, prior to the recording of the deeds is also reasonable 
10 
evidence that title passed at the time of the date of the deed and not upon 
recording. See, 23 Am Jur 2d, Deeds §§ 159, 163 (grantees possession of 
the deed or of the property creates a strong presumption of delivery of the 
deed). The number of different owners, the multiple surveys and other 
listed evidence show the reasonableness of the trial court's findings. 
Indeed, such Findings are clearly correct, not erroneous. 
Mr. Hafen has not marshaled the evidence to be used as a sword 
against him in aid of Mr. Jacobs' appeal. The recitation of these items of 
evidence, however, do show that if Mr. Jacobs had marshaled the evidence, 
the trial courts factual findings were still based upon reasonable, 
competent testimony and should be upheld. 
By analogy, Mr. Jacobs' argument, is procedurally the same as in 
the Scharf v. BMG Corp., case and should be dealt with in a similar fashion. 
Therein, the court stated: 
Erickson makes numerous arguments based on the facts 
as he presented them to the trial court, rather than on the 
facts as found by that court. However, at no point does he 
even discuss the detailed findings entered by the lower 
court that contradict his factual assertions. With respect 
to these matters, we take as our starting point the trial 
court's findings.... 
The court then set forth the standard of review and the need to marshal 
the evidence, and then stated: 
Erickson has not begun to carry that heavy burden. 
Nowhere does he marshal the evidence supporting his 
version of the facts, much less the evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. Under these circumstances, we 
decline to further consider Erickson's attack on the factual 
findings. 
Id. at 1069-1070. 
1 1 
The trial court's factual findings, in all particulars, but 
specifically relating to the passage of a long period of acquiescence and the 
divergence of ownership in 1973, should be upheld as being supported by 
the evidence presented. 
If the 1973 deed were the only fact in evidence concerning this 
property, the date of the deed would be presumed to be the operative 
date. Courts have long held that recording of deeds is irrelevant, as far as 
when title passes. Title passes upon delivery of the deed, not on the 
recording date. Many courts have held that where the date of the deed's 
execution is shown, a presumption arises that the deed was delivered on 
that date. See Wickwire v. City and Borough of Juneau, 557 P2d at 785; 
Matter of Laue's Estate, 589 P2d at 563; Huntington City v. Peterson, 30 
Utah 2d at 410; Gross v Gross, 781 P2d 284, 285 (Mont 1989). The Court 
in Gross v Gross, 781 P2d at 285 stated, "When a deed is executed a 
presumption arises that delivery occurred and that recording the deed 
strengthens that presumption. We conclude that this presumption can 
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence." (citing 23 Am Jur 2d, 
Deeds , § 172 and Controlled Receivables, Inc. v Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 
413 P2d 807). See also, 23 Am Jur 2d, Deeds. § 157 ("...in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, a deed is presumed to have been delivered at the 
date of the instrument. This presumption is strengthened if the date of 
acknowledgment is the same as that of the deed".), § 165 ("Upon recording, 
the presumption of delivery relates back to the date of the execution of the 
deed".). In Utah, a presumption arises by law, that once a deed has been 
recorded, the law presumes that delivery occurred, notwithstanding any 
lapse of time between the date of the instrument and the date of 
recording. U.C.A. §57-4a-4(l)(d) (1953, as amended). 
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Mr. Hafen introduced the 1973 deed (trial exhibit 18). The 
deed, on its face, shows that it was executed on April 15, 1973. This date 
appears above the grantors signatures and was written again in the notary 
portion of the deed. As it concerns the physical execution and delivery of 
this deed, this was the evidence produced at trial. Tr. 49-50. Mr. Jacobs 
argued in closing arguments that no one knew when delivery occurred and 
thus the 1983 recording date should be accepted as the date of delivery. 
Mr. Jacobs did not present any evidence rebutting that delivery occurred 
on April 15, 1973. It was Mr. Jacobs1 burden to establish non-delivery of 
the deed, if that were in dispute. Having not produced any such evidence, 
the trial court properly could hold that the deed was delivered at the time 
it was executed. See Hackett v. Hackett 429 P2d at 757; White v. White, 
368 P2d at 419; Controlled Receiveables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d at 
423 . 
The 1973 deed, of course, was not the only evidence before the 
trial court. The other facts, concerning the subsequent owners use of the 
property and their own conveyance of the property before recording, 
bolster the trial courts holding that April 15, 1973 was the operative date 
of this deed. 
B. Non-contested issues, facts and conclusions are not 
in dispute on this appeal. 
Mr. Jacobs argues two points: First, that the trial court 
committed error when it held that ownership of the property became 
separate in 1973 and second, that a long period of acquiescence had 
passed. The trial court entered several other findings, which have not 
been addressed or disputed by Mr. Jacobs. Such issues, whether they be 
factual findings or legal conclusions, should not be disturbed by this court. 
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In particular, 3 of the 4 elements of boundary by acquiescence have not 
been challenged, i.e., occupation up to a visible line, by adjoining property 
owners, and mutual acquiescence in that line as a boundary. Having not 
challenged the other facts, they should be accepted by this court as proper 
and valid. 
C. The trial court correctly concluded that the 
boundary had been acquiesced in for fta long period of time11. 
The boundary by acquiescence has existed for more than 18-
and-one-half-years. The first deed was dated April 15, 1973 and Mr. 
Jacobs filed this action on November 4, 1991. Record 1. Our courts have 
declared that a general time frame for boundary by acquiescence is 20 
years, but that 15 years is not sufficient. However, our court has stated 
that there is no exact time requirement, and that the circumstances of each 
case must be considered. Where unusual circumstances are shown, a 
lesser time period is sufficient. See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P2d at 420; 
Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P2d at 795; Parsons v . 
Anderson, 690 P2d at 539. The elements for a boundary by acquiescence, 
as shown by the above cases include: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences 
or buildings. 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
3. For a long period of time. 
4. By adjoining landowners. 
The real legal issue presented thus rests on the element of the 
eighteen-and-one-half year time period. The District Court found and held 
that such time was sufficient. This court reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness, in so doing, the court reviews "the record for the purpose of 
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ascertaining whether there is substantial, competent, admissible evidence 
to support the conclusions reached. If so, this court is precluded from 
disturbing it". Bush v. Coult 594 P2d at 866. See also. Nielsen v. Chim-
Hsien Wang. 613 P2d at 514; Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P2d at 1070. The 
factual circumstances which may have been somewhat unusual and used 
to justify less than a 20-year use included: 
1. The fence had existed for 40-50 years. 
2. Mr. Jacobs' predecessors in interest, had quit claimed all of 
the property on several occasions, utilizing a title company, however had 
only issued one warranty deed to the property in sections 35 and 36, and 
that deed went to Mr. Hafen's predecessors in interest in 1973. 
3. Three surveys were done on the property in the late 70's 
and early 80?s. 
4. Property owners left the fence as it had existed, even though 
they had used the services of title companies and surveyors. 
5. This parcel is fenced, while the surrounding property is 
unfenced open range. 
6. Mr. Hafen built a house on the property. 
7. Several title changes occurred in the chain of title of both 
part ies . 
The Staker v. Ainsworth Court stated, 
There is no indication in the record that any predecessor 
in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with a belief 
that the fence line was the boundary.... Additionally, there 
is no indication that any landowner ever notified his 
neighbor of a disagreement over the true boundary. 
Id. at 420-421. The present case is consistent factually. In considering all 
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of these facts, the trial court did not err in the legal conclusion reached. 
Under the correction-of-error standard, our court does not consider and 
weigh the evidence de novo. As stated in Owen v Owen, 579 P2d 911,913 
(Utah 1978), "Whether the justices of this Court, or any particular justice, 
would have arrived at the same conclusion as the trial judge, or whether 
some other trial judge would have done so is not the test of its validity." 
Id., at 913. See also T.R.F. v Felan. 760 P2d 906, 909 (Utah App 1988). 
This court has stated that where unusual circumstances are 
shown, a lesser period than 20 years can suffice to show boundary by 
acquiescence. This court has not yet defined what unusual circumstances 
would be required in these situations. The trial court took the facts listed 
above into account. One or two of the listed facts standing alone may or 
may not be so unusual as to support the finding that a long period of time 
had elapsed. However, when taking all of the facts into account, it is easy 
to see how the trial court determined that an acquiescence for a long time 
had passed. A few of these facts seem to be quite unusual in the context of 
this case. Mr. Jacobs1 property in sections 1 and 2 has had at least 6 
different owners during this eighteen-and-one-half year time period, 2 of 
which were title companies. Tr. 30-33, Trial exhibits 2, 4, 5, and 9. There 
were at least 3 surveys done, 2 of which were done in 1979 and 1985. 
The section corner of sections 1, 2, 35, and 36 is the same location and lies 
within the fenced pasture. This last fact becomes unusual in the context of 
this case because the surveyors use section corners as base points, and 
such are marked as section corners on the ground. Mr. Jacobs' surveyor 
found this corner and it was marked with a USGLO Brass cap, as well as a 
separate rebar and cap marker. Trial exhibit 14. His survey in 1979 was 
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for the purpose of locating section corners. Tr. 24. With the section marker 
visible and clearly marked, the fence clearly not along the section line, 
surveys having been done, and 2 title companies in the chain of Mr. Jacobs' 
title, still none of the property owners challenged the fence, as it existed, 
as the true boundary. These circumstances, together with the other facts, 
show that the trial court had "substantial, competent, admissible evidence 
to support the conclusions reached". The 18-1/2 years was a sufficiently 
long period under the facts and circumstances of this case to prove a 
boundary by acquiescence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court entered two factual findings which Mr. Jacobs 
disputes. One, that ownership of the property separated in 1973 and two, 
that a long period had elapsed. Mr. Jacobs failed to properly marshal the 
evidence and show that these facts were clearly erroneous. These facts 
should not be set aside. 
Mr. Jacobs argues that the evidence overall does not support a 
conclusion of boundary by acquiescence, specifically as it relates to the 
element of the acquiescence occurring for a long time. 
Mr. Jacobs believes there are no unusual circumstances to vary 
from the general 20-year-time period to the eighteen-and-one-half year 
period as found by the trial court. The facts show otherwise. The 
interrelationship of the facts in the context of this case were unusual. The 
trial court properly accepted the evidence presented, the evidence was 
substantial and competent. 
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The conclusion that a boundary by acquiescence had been 
established was correct and should be upheld by this court. The trial 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this. __day of /^^oi^j^ru , 1993. 
LaMar J Winward t
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed four true and exact signed copies of 
the above and foregoing Appellees' Brief, on this _ day of 
/^iOAjD^ri^^ , 1993 to: 
Phillip L. Foremaster 
247 Sugar Leo Road 
St. George, Utah 84770-7944 
# 1 J ^ ^ 
LaMar J <Winward 
18 
ADDENDUM 
Warranty Deed, dated April 15, 1973 (Trial Exhibit 18) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Judgment 
Amended Judgment 
Warranty Deed, dated April 15, 1973 (Trial Exhibit 18) 
Recorded at Rcquett of AMJ^^-ILJI^ ll&A.. 
*tf)o.0..A...% M. Fee PtW %6*M.A , bCJa.a^c^uJ^..Q.^^x<^M. County Recorder 
By 
.... D<p. Book 
Mill tax notice to ...E..A. ?.. lRYl?.tment Co?_ 
Joe Hutchlngs 
.-ReL 1.9QJ?83 fc/o 
608 South Main - St. George, Utah 
84770 
WARRANTY DEED 
CASTLE CREEK PROPERTIES, a Limited Partnership consisting of Dean R. 
Jeffs, Lloyd Hayes, Fred Hugie and Larry Smith, General Partners 
of Kaysville 
CONVEY and W A R R A N T to 
County of Davis 
grantors 
, State of Utah, hereby 
E & F INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC,, a Utah Corporat ion, as 
to an UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST; and JOE, HUTCHINQS, 
as to an UNDIVIDED ON&liALF INTEREST, 
J 
of St , George, Utah 84770 
310,00 & o the r valuable cons idera t ion-
the following described tract of land in Garfield 
State of Utah: 
grantees 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS. 
County, i 
PARCEL 1: The W^SWi of Section 36,,Township 37 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M. 
PARCEL 2; BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 37 South, 
Range 6 West, SLB<ScM and running thence North 2640,0 feet to the East quarter 
corner of said Section 35; thence West 208,0 feet, more or less, to the East 
right-of-way line of Highway U.S, 89j thence Southerly along said right of way 
line a distance of 2634,2 feet, more or less, to the South line of isaid Section 
35; thence East 135.5 feet, more or less, to the £oint of beginning, 
TOGETHER with two and one-half (2%) gallons per minute of water right from 
Diversion Point #20, as shown on page 18, Sev1er^R1ver Decree, with the Utah 
State Water Engineer. 
WITNESS, the hand s of said grantors .this 15th 
Signed In the Presence of \ ... 
^j4^.^^S^^^^ / _ 
STATE OF UTAH 




On the /JS"^ <*« A p r i l , A, D., 1973 personally 
l%
 ' ' " >v \ appeared before me D«an R. Je f fs and Fred J , Hugie, General 
.„.*. \ "* ' . \ '*V\ Par tners of Cast le Creek P r o p e r t i e s , a 
j V ' ' '* ! t».%. V?'*; Limited Par tnership 
~
J
 •••;•'.-• .j .* the signer s of the within'Instrument/who duly acknowledged 
--*' ' jsst / to me that thay execute^ the same. ~ A 
sward Allan Car te r , \ . Notary Public 
My Commljjion expire* M Y J & . 1221 My residence Is ..^lb...B.?.^t..}3^JV.l9. 
• O. UT TITLC CO., »» \i. tOO N.. ST. OCDROC, 
Certificate 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD ) 
) SS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I, /L^S B^n./^*- duly elected, qualified and acting County Recorder in and 
for Garfield County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of 
^x-ovv-y ss<y: /*>0 £ £ 3 
VJ/}/2-/2-/+AJ*-y €><?&& recorded (of filed) 2S ^ day of /J/?^<^*/ 19 83 
and now of record in my office, Book 2"7B Page 32(& 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my.hand and affixed the seal of the 
Recorder, at the city of Panguitch, Utah, this ?/ *' day of J^z^y 19 92. 
i DEFENDANT'S i < ^ £ ^ ^ C ^ 
I EXHIBIT I GARFIELD COUNTY RECORDER 
* (& - I »/ 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
LAMAR J WINWARD - A3528 
Attorney at Law 
150 North 200 East, Suite 204 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 628-1191 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK JACOBS ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
WILFORD L. HAFEN, and JoANN ; 
B. HAFEN, his wife. ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT and 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 2592 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Court 
sitting without a jury on August 3, 1992, before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Court Judge. Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Philip L. Foremaster. The Defendant was 
present in person and represented by counsel, LaMar J Winward. 
The court heard the testimony of the witnesses, reviewed the 
evidence submitted and being fully advised in the premises now 
finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Defendants are the legal owners of property 
located in Sections 1 and 2 of T 38 S, R W 6, SLBM, such property 
being located in the Swapp pasture and is identified by the fence line 
of the Swapp pasture. That property is in the surveyors plat 
3\ 
/rfcama, aq 
outlining the fence line on trial exhibit 1. Said property is 
approximately 1450 feet by 390 feet. 
2. The north boundary line of Section 1 and 2 is the county 
line between Garfield and Kane County, Utah. The property in 
Section 2 also borders U.S. Highway 89. The Defendants are also 
owners of real property located in Garfield County being in Section 
35 and Section 36, T 37 S, R 6 W, SLBM 
3. The dividing line between the properties has been 
established as a fence line which has been in existence for a number 
of years, being more than 40 to 50 years. However, the property 
owners have been different only since 1973 as to the Section 35, 36 
and Section 1 properties. Section 2 properties were held by other 
parties in the early 70's and before. 
4. That an existing fence is located on the section 1 and 2 
property and its location is described on the surveyors plat - trial 
exhibit #1. 
5. The evidence at trial indicates that the fence has been in 
existence for an extensive period of time, probably exceeding 40 or 
50 years. 
6. The court finds that the recorded chain of title as shown 
by the Garfield and Kane County records and by the deeds presented 
at trial show that the property of Defendants and Plaintiffs located in 
Sections 1, 35, and 36, was in common ownership in 1973, however, 
the ownership was divided at that time by a warranty deed from 
Castle Creek Properties, conveying the Section 35 and Section 36 
property to others. 
35 
7. Separate ownership has been established since 1973. The 
Plaintiffs predecessors in interest have conveyed all of the subject 
property by quit claim deed, back and forth with a title company, 
even though they conveyed the Section 35 and 36 property to 
Defendant's predecessors in interest by warranty deed in 1973. 
8. At least 3 surveys were done of the subject property in 
the late 70rs and early 80's. 
9. The property owners did not take any action concerning 
the existence of the fence line surrounding the Swapp pasture, even 
though the owners had utilized the services of title companies and 
surveyors throughout this period of time. 
10. The court finds that the fence line surrounding the Swapp 
pasture was a visible line. 
The Court finds that the adjacent property owners mutually 
acquiesced in that fence line as a boundary. 
The court finds that the fence line which was acquiesced in as 
the boundary was for a sufficient period of time, being at least 18 
years by the adjacent property owners. 
11 . The court finds that the fence line was acquiesced by 
adjacent property owners since at least 1973 as to the Section 35, 36 
and Section 1 properties and for a period of time before 1973 for the 
Section 2 property. 
12. The Defendants are entitled to a decree quieting title in 
the property located within the fence line in Sections 1 and 2. 
3L> 
The Court having entered its findings of fact now enter its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree and judgment of 
this court quieting title on the property described in Sections 1 and 2 
located within the Swapp pasture fence line and against the 
Plaintiffs, which judgment should provide that the Defendant is the 
owner and entitled to possession of said property and that Plaintiffs 
have no right, title, or interest therein. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this _ _ / _ _ day of 
&;•/?</ ^ .
 1 9 9 2 . 
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Judgment 
LAMAR J WINWARD - A3528 
Attorney at Law 
150 North 200 East, Suite 204 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 628-1191 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK JACOBS ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
WILFORD L. HAFEN, and JoANN ; 
B. HAFEN, his wife. ; 
Defendant. ] 
) JUDGMENT 
> Civil No. 2592 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Court 
sitting without a jury on August 3, 1992, before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Court Judge. Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Philip L. Foremaster. The Defendant was 
present in person and represented by counsel, LaMar J Winward. 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, Wilford L. Hafen and Joanne B. Hafen are the owners of 
and entitled to the possession of the following described real 
property located in Kane County, State of Utah, located in Section 1 
and 2 of T 38 S, R 6 W, SLBM, being that portion of said sections 
5^ 
y^du 
particularly described on the surveyors plat. Said description shall 
be reduced to a metes and bounds description and entered as part of 
this judgment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED the Plaintiff 





AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
On the 1st day of September, 1992, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Findings of FAct & Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
to the following, postage prepaid from offices at Manti, Utah: 
Mr. LaMar J. Winward 
Attorney at Law 
150 North 200 East 
Suite 204 
St. George, Utah, 84770 
Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster 
Attorney at Law 
247 Sugar Leo Road 
St. George, Utah 
84770-7944 
^2^< 
Carole B. Mellor 
6th District Administrator 
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Amended Judgment 
LAMAR J WINWARD - A3528 
Attorney at Law 
150 North 200 East, Suite 204 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 628-1191 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






WILFORD L. HAFEN, and JoANN ) Civil No. 2592 
B. HAFEN, his wife. ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Court 
sitting without a jury on August 3, 1992, before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Court Judge. Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Philip L. Foremaster. The Defendant was 
present in person and represented by counsel, LaMar J Winward. 
The court entered judgment in favor of the Defendants to certain real 
property located in Kane County, State of Utah and provided by way 
of said judgement that the property description be reduced to a 
meets and bounds description and included as part of the judgment. 
The property description having been reduced to a meets and 
bounds description and the court having previously entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, Wilford L. Hafen and Joanne B. Hafen are the owners of 
and entitled to the possession of the following described real 
A< 
fH&nw UlC/ 
property located in Kane County, State of Utah, located in Section 1 
and 2 of T 38 S, R 6 W, SLBM, and more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Section 1, Township 38 
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 89°51f31" East 1,306.39 feet along the Section line to an 
existing fence line; thence South 1°47'57" East 392.68 feet along said 
fence Tine to a fence corner; thence North 87°27'59" West 897.02 feet 
along a fence line to a fence corner; thence South 5°36,47" West 41.25 
feet along a fence line to a fence corner; thence North 87o00'13" West 
542.98 feet along a fence line to the Easterly right-of-way line of U.S. 
Highway 89; thence North l°50'36n West 362.59 feet along said right-
of-way line to the North line of Section 2, Township 38 South, Range 
6 West; thence South 89°56,49" East 135.36 feet along said line to the 
point of beginning. Containing 12.37 acres, more or less. 
DATED this Y^ day of f,t.{* i ^ \ . 1992. 
District 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and exact unsigned copy 
of the above and foregoing Amended Judgment, postage prepaid, on 
this J_5__ day of (Zck^UL , 1992 to: 
Phillip L. Foremaster 
247 Sugar Leo Road 
St. George, Utah 84770-7944 
Secretary 
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